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1 Abstract
Background:  This  meta-analytic  review  examines  the  theory  of  mind
profiles  in  both  patients  with  anorexia  nervosa  (AN)  and  autistic
individuals. 
Methodology: The studies examining theory of mind were divided into the
following  categories:  emotional  theory  of  mind,  understanding  simple
social situations, understanding complex social interactions, and implicit
social  attribution.  All  included studies  investigated differences between
healthy control (HCs) individuals and people with AN or autistic people.
Differences in theory of mind profile between people with AN and autistic
people were explored by conducting moderator analyses. 
Results: People with AN and autistic people showed a similar theory of
mind  profile,  but  autistic  individuals  showed  greater  difficulties,
particularly in emotional theory of mind.  
Conclusions:  Although  both  people  with  AN  and  autistic  people  have
significant difficulties in all aspects of theory of mind relative to the HCs,
some differences in the underlying profile may be present. However, due
to relative  paucity  of  theory  of  mind research among people  with  AN,
further research is still needed before firm conclusion can be drawn.
Highlights
• Meta-analytic review of theory of mind in AN and ASD compared
to HCs
• Performance was worse in AN and ASD relative to HC in all areas
of theory of mind
• Compared to AN, autistic people performed worse on emotional
theory of mind
• Performance in AN and ASD was similar in understanding simple
social interactions
• Performance  in  AN  and  ASD  was  similar  in  implicit  social
attribution
• Potential processes underlying theory of mind profile in AN and
ASD are discussed
2 Introduction
Autism spectrum disorder  (ASD)  is  a  life-long  developmental  condition
characterised  by  difficulties  with  social  interaction,  repetitive  and
restricted behaviours and interests,  and sensory sensitivities  (American
Psychiatric Association, 2013). Approximately 1 in 100 people in the UK
population are on the autism spectrum (Brugha et al., 2011) with the most
recent estimates of gender ratios standing at 3:1 male to female (Loomes
et al., 2017). The most prominent model of autism postulates that autistic
individual’s1 difficulties  with social  cognition centres  on theory of  mind
abilities  (Baron-Cohen  et  al.,  1985).  According  to  the  model,  autistic
people have difficulties with social  imagination,  particularly in terms of
understanding  that  other  people  have  knowledge,  thoughts,  and
motivations which are different to their own. This has been supported by a
range of studies across the lifespan, including child  (Colle et al.,  2007;
Happe, 1994) and adult participants (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001; Kleinman
et  al.,  2001).  Research  has  also  shown  that  autistic  people  can  have
difficulties  in  facial  affect  recognition  and  production  (Loveland  et  al.,
2008; McIntosh et al., 2006), and in emotion recognition (Bal et al., 2010;
Kuusikko et al., 2009), both of which are skills which play a significant role
in our social interactions.
1 Identity-first language (i.e., autistic person), opposed to person-first language (i.e., 
person with autism), is preferred by many autistic people and their allies. Therefore, in 
this article, the authors use predominantly identity-first language (Kenny, L., Hattersley, 
C., Molins, B., Buckley, C., Povey, C., Pellicano, E., 2016. Which terms should be used to 
describe autism? Perspectives from the UK autism community. Autism : the international 
journal of research and practice 20, 442-462.).
Anorexia nervosa (AN) is a life-threatening eating disorder that typically
develops  during  adolescence  (American  Psychiatric  Association,  2013).
Despite the fact that majority of people diagnosed with AN are female,
elevated prevalence of comorbid ASD symptoms among people with AN
has been recently documented  (Bentz et al.,  2017a; Huke et al.,  2013;
Vagni  et  al.,  2016;  Westwood  et  al.,  2017a;  Westwood  et  al.,  2017c).
Furthermore,  experimental  studies  have  reported  that  people  with  AN
show similar difficulties in social cognition as autistic individuals. Recent
meta-analytic reviews have shown that people with AN have difficulties in
reception and production of  facial  affect  (Bora and Kose, 2016; Caglar-
Nazali et al.,  2014). However, unlike in ASD, people with AN also show
mood congruent, negative attentional and interpretation biases that may
have some impact on these difficulties in social cognition (Ambwani et al.,
2016; Cardi et al.,  2013). Such biases in interpretation could lead to a
differential  profile  in  theory  of  mind  in  AN relative  to  ASD.  Therefore,
further investigation of similarities and differences in the social cognition
profiles in AN and ASD is of interest.
The aim of the present review was to synthesise the existing literature
investigating the theory of mind profile in autistic individuals and in those
with AN. Specifically, we aimed to examine understanding of emotions in
others, perspective taking, interpretation of social behaviour, and intuitive
social attribution in these disorders, from early adolescence to adulthood.
We  also  aimed  to  explore  whether  autistic  people  were  significantly
different from those with AN in their theory of mind performance. 
3 Methods
1.1 Literature search
Two  literature  searches  were  conducted  to  identify  articles  that
investigated theory of mind among autistic people and among those with
AN.  The following search terms were used to conduct  the first  search:
(("autism spectrum disorder") OR "Asperger syndrome") AND ("theory of
mind" OR mentalizing OR “Reading the mind in the eyes” OR “reading the
mind  in  the  voice”  OR  “reading  the  mind  in  the  video”).  The  second
search was conducted using the search terms  ("anorexia nervosa") AND
("theory of mind" OR mentalizing OR “Reading the mind in the eyes” OR
“reading the mind in the voice” OR “reading the mind in the video”). In
accordance with the PRISMA guidelines (Moher et al., 2009), the following
electronic  databases  were  used  to  conduct  the  literature  searches:
Pubmed, Scopus, Web of Knowledge, and OVID (PsycINFO, PsycARTICLES,
MEDLINE, AGRIS, Embase). Additionally, the bibliographies of all included
papers  and  related  review  articles  were  screened  for  any  additional
papers that were not found through the initial searches. 
1.2 Eligibility criteria
To be included in the review the studies were required to 1)  include a
sample of adults or adolescents aged 12 years or older with a diagnosis of
ASD, Asperger’s Disorder (AS), high functioning autism (HFA), or AN; 2)
include an age-matched healthy comparison (HC) group; 3) assess theory
of  mind;  4)  have at  least  ten participants  in  each group.  Only  studies
assessing explicit  theory of mind were included, and any studies using
tasks in which theory of mind ability was inferred from eye movements or
reaction times were excluded. Studies in which only young children took
part were not included as AN is often diagnosed in early adolescence or
later, and thus comparing young children with ASD and AN would not be
possible.  Additionally,  studies  that  used  self-report  questionnaires  or
parental report measures to assess theory of mind were not included; nor
were studies that used tasks that produced error rates, such as the Penny
Hiding Game, because the outcome measure had the opposite direction
compared to other included tasks making statistical comparisons difficult.
To reduce heterogeneity in the sample, studies that assessed theory of
mind  during  functional  magnetic  resonance  imaging  (fMRI)  or  positron
emission tomography were not included. This was done because the tasks
often  need  to  be  substantially  amended to  be  used  in  such  contexts,
making comparisons with behavioural versions of similar tasks difficult.
Finally, we used the following definition of theory of mind by Frith and Frith
(2005):  Theory of mind refers to the ability infer information about others’
emotions,  intentions,  knowledge,  and  beliefs  from social  interaction  or
given  information.  Therefore,  we  did  not  include  studies  that  only
investigated recognition of basic emotions, but studies that required the
identification of complex emotions or emotional mental states,  such as
frustration, were included.  
1.3 Study selection
The study selection and screening flow charts are presented in Figures
1A,B. The literature search and initial screening of the articles based on
title and abstract was conducted by two of the authors. Inclusion of papers
following initial screening was decided by the whole team in consensus
meetings. If there was any uncertainty about inclusion of certain articles
they were brought to the whole team for further discussion. 
Figure 1. Study selection flow charts
A. The study selection flow chart of studies investigating theory of mind in
autism spectrum disorders. B. The study selection flow chart of studies
investigating theory of mind in anorexia nervosa.
After initial screening, 101 full text articles investigating theory of mind in
ASD were  assessed for  eligibility  (Figure  1A).  After  this  screening,  five
articles  were  excluded  because  we  were  unable  to  obtain  an  English
language version of the papers, and nine articles were excluded for being
conference  abstracts.  After  further  screening  four  publications  were
excluded  for  collecting  theory  of  mind  data  during  an  fMRI  scan,  four
papers were excluded for reporting error rates or inferring theory of mind
from reaction  times,  and  another  three  were  excluded  for  including  a
sample of less than ten participants. Fourteen papers did not report the
relevant  data  in  the  text  or  supplementary  materials,  and  the
corresponding authors of these papers were contacted to gain access to
the  data.  One  author,  White  et  al.  (2014),  provided  data  via  personal
correspondence.  Finally,  63  articles  investigating  the  theory  of  mind
profile in ASD were included in the review. 
Following  initial  screening,  29  papers  investigating  theory  of  mind  in
people  with  AN  were  assessed  further  (Figure  1B).  Two  papers  were
excluded because we were unable to obtain an English language version
of  the  paper,  and  another  three  were  excluded  because  they  were
conference abstracts. One paper was excluded because the task involved
assessing  theory  of  mind  used  specifically  in  interactions  with  the
participants’ parents and was thus deemed to be too specific and another
was excluded for including the same sample as a previous study from the
same group. One paper did not provide the relevant data in the text or
supplementary materials,  but  the corresponding author,  Harrison et  al.
(2010b),  provided the data through personal  correspondence.  The final
sample included 22 papers that were included in the review.
1.4 Data collection and synthesis
In  addition  to  sample  sizes,  means  and  standard  deviations  from  the
theory of mind tasks were extracted from the included studies. If a study
reported  standard  errors,  standard  deviations  were  estimated  with  the
following formula: SD=SE∗√ N . The extracted data was used to calculate
standardised  mean  differences  between  the  patient  and  HC  samples,
which were then entered into four separate meta-analyses exploring the
theory  of  mind  profile  in  individuals  with  ASD  or  AN.  To  explore  any
potential between-study heterogeneity, additional data regarding age, the
IQ of the patient group, the proportion of male participants in the sample,
and the type of tasks used to assess theory of mind was extracted. 
1.5 Theory of mind tasks
The theory of mind tasks used in each study are summarised in Table 1. A
wide range of  different  tasks were used to assess theory of  mind and
these  tasks  were  divided  into  four  separate  categories  representing
different  aspects  of  theory  of  mind:  emotional  theory  of  mind,
understanding  of  simple  social  interactions,  understanding  of  complex
social  interactions,  and  implicit  social  attribution.  .  The  tasks  were
categorised  according  to  methodological  similarities  as  judged  by  the
authors.
1.5.1 Emotional theory of mind tasks
Forty-four studies used the Reading the Mind in the Eyes task (RMET) to
assess emotional theory of mind (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997b). In the RMET
participants  are presented with images of  eyes and are then asked to
identify  the  emotion  or  complex  mental  state  the  eyes  are  trying  to
convey by selecting the appropriate response from four options presented
on the screen. Five studies used adapted versions of the same task, the
Reading the Mind in the Voice task (RMVT) or the Reading the Mind in the
Film task (RMFT)  (Golan et al.,  2006; Rutherford et al.,  2002). In these
tasks participants are presented with a short verbal or film excerpt, and
are  asked  to  identify  the  emotion  that  is  being  conveyed in  a  similar
manner to the RMET. Two studies used the Levels of Emotional Awareness
Scale (LEAS), in which participants are presented with short scenarios to
assess their awareness of their  own and other’s emotions  (Lane et al.,
1990). Another two studies used the Emotions category of the Movie for
the  Assessment  of  Social  Cognition  (MASC),  in  which  participants  are
presented  with  short  films  and  asked  to  identify  the  emotion  the
characters in the films are portraying (Dziobek et al., 2006a).  Additional
measures used to assess emotional theory of mind included the Arena of
Emotions (AoE) (Rosenblau et al., 2015) and the emotions subscale of the
Animated Theory of Mind test (A-ToM)  (Schaller and Rauh, 2017), which
are similar to the MASC, and the Computerised Theory of Mind test (C-ToM)
(Shamay-Tsoory, 2008), which was based on the RMET but also utilised
gaze direction. The theory of mind score was calculated from the number
of correct responses.
1.5.2 Understanding of simple social interactions
Tasks  that  were  grouped  into  the  understanding  of  simple  social
interactions category  all  assessed  participants’  accuracy  of  detecting
mistakes in given social  scenarios or stories. Thirteen studies used the
Faux  Pas  test  to  assess  understanding  of  simple  social  interactions
(Gregory et al., 2002; Stone et al., 1998). The task involves participants
reading stories and detecting whether the characters commit social faux
pas or mistakes. Nine studies used a similar story task, the False Belief
test, in which participants were asked about the characters’ false beliefs
due  to  changing  social  situations  (Baron  Cohen,  1985;  Baron-Cohen,
1989).  Other  tasks  used  to  assess  understanding  of  simple  social
interactions included the theory of mind subscale of the Developmental
NEuroPSYchological  Assessment  (NEPSY-II)  (Korkman,  2007a,  b),  the
cognitive subscale of the A-ToM (Schaller and Rauh, 2017), the Hint Task
(Corcoran et al., 1995), a Theory of Mind Scale (Wellman and Liu, 2004),
and the Dewey Story Test  (DST)  (Dewey,  1998),  all  of  which  assessed
understanding  of  other’s  perspectives  and  false  beliefs.  In  each  task
participants were asked to answer either multiple-choice or open-ended
comprehension questions after each scenario.  The answers were either
scored correct or incorrect and the theory of mind score was calculated
from the number of correct responses.
1.5.3 Understanding of complex social interactions
The tasks that were grouped into the  understanding of  complex social
interactions category involved more than spotting simple social faux pas
or mistakes. The tasks included understanding of sarcasm, jokes, white
lies, double bluff, and other types of non-literal social interaction. Fifteen
studies used the Strange Stories Task (SST) to assess understanding of
complex social interactions  (Happe, 1994) and six studies used the full
MASC  to  assess  understanding  of  various  types  of  social  scenarios
(Dziobek et al., 2006a). The other tasks used to assess understanding of
complex social interactions included the complex interaction subscale of
the  C-ToM task  (Shamay-Tsoory,  2008),  Cartoons,  Commercials,  various
types  of  stories,  the  Social  cognition  and object  relation  (SCORS)  task
(Westen,  1995),  and  the  Awareness  of  Social  Inference  Test  (TASIT)
(McDonald  et  al.,  2003),  all  of  which  assessed  participants’  ability  to
understand complex social  interactions.  In  all  tasks the scenarios were
followed  by  either  multiple-choice  or  open-ended  comprehension
questions. In tasks other than the SST, participants’ answers were either
scored correct or incorrect and the theory of mind score was a sum of the
number of  correct responses. In the SST participants’ responses to the
open-ended questions  could  also  be  scored  as  partially  correct  if  they
gave  some  indication  of  understanding  the  character’s  thoughts,
emotions,  or mental states. The participants’  answers were scored 2 if
they were correct,  1 if  they were  partially  correct,  and 0 if  they were
incorrect, and the final theory of mind scores from the SST was a sum of
the scores from each story.
1.5.4 Implicit social attribution
Ten studies used the Smith-Happé animations (SHA),  four  studies used
Happé’s  cartoons,  and another  two studies  used the  Social  Attribution
Task (SAT) to assess  implicit social attribution (Abell et al., 2000; Heider
and Simmel, 1944; Klin, 2000). Other tasks used to assess implicit social
attribution  included  cartoons,  the  narrative  version  of  the  Projective
Imagination  Test  (PIT),  the  Thematic  Apperception  Test  (TAT),  and  a
reading task  (Blackshaw et al.,  2001; Murray, 1943).  All  tasks required
participants to provide verbal descriptions of the stimuli they were given
and the number of theory of mind terms used in descriptions formed the
theory  of  mind  score.  The  SHA  task  could  also  involve  participants
categorising  the  videos  into  three  separate  categories  representing
random  movements,  simple  interactions,  and  complex  interactions
between  the  stimuli.  In  these  studies,  the  number  of  correct
categorisations formed the theory of mind score. Despite of the multiple-
choice aspect of this task, it is believed to assess implicit social attribution
because  of  the  nature  of  the  stimuli,  which  consist  of  silent  videos
showing complex interactions between two triangles. 
1.6 Statistical analysis
All  statistical  analyses  were  conducted  with  R  (R  Core  Team,  2015).
Unbiased Hedges’ g effect size estimates (Hedges, 1981), along with 95%
confidence intervals were calculated to estimate differences between the
patient and HC groups in theory of mind. The effect size estimates were
interpreted as small ( 0.20), medium ( 0.50), and large ( 0.80) (Hedges,
1981). 
The user-contributed package Metafor was used to conduct all statistical
analyses including meta-analyses, meta-regressions, and publication bias
analyses (Viechtbauer, 2010). Because some of the studies included more
than one measure of theory of mind or compared two different groups of
patients  against  the  same  control  group,  multivariate  random  effects
meta-analyses  were  conducted  using  the  rma.mv function.  The
multivariate meta-analysis accounts for the covariance that arises from
the same sample being entered into the analysis more than once, allowing
for investigation into differences between various measures of theory of
mind. 
Cochran’s Q and I2 statistics were calculated to examine between-study
heterogeneity. To examine if studies with autistic people and people with
AN were significantly different from each other when compared to a HC
group,  a  moderator  analysis  with  the  diagnostic  group  (ASD,  AN)  was
conducted.  Additionally,  where  significant  between-study  heterogeneity
was  present,  meta-regressions  were  conducted  with  the  following
moderators: study quality score, age, the type of task used, and estimated
IQ of the patient group. All moderators were entered into the same model
to investigate the impact of each on the heterogeneity while holding other
moderators constant. If any moderators were highly correlated with each
other they were automatically dropped from the meta-regression. 
The presence of bias was explored by examining each study using the
Study Quality Assessment Tool for Case-Control Studies developed by the
United  States  National  Institute  of  Health.  Two  authors,  J.L.  and  F.S.
independently assessed each study using the tool and rater agreement
was calculated. If both raters gave a study a poor rating, that is the study
failed to meet three or  more of  the criteria,  it  was excluded from any
subsequent analysis. If there was any substantial disagreement between
the raters, the study causing the disagreement was brought to the whole
team for further assessment. Study quality scores, proportion of criteria
met, were then calculated for each study and included in the subsequent
meta-regressions.  Standardised residuals and Cook’s  distance values of
each study were computed to investigate if any study was substantially
different from the others and thus, a potential outlier. Any study with the
z-score of the standardised residual over 1.96 and Cook’s distance over 1,
was  inspected  further  (Cook  and  Weisberg,  1982;  Viechtbauer  and
Cheung, 2010) The presence of publication bias in each meta-analysis The
presence  of  publication  bias  was  explored  by  conducting  Begg’s  rank
correlation test of funnel plot asymmetry (Begg and Mazumdar, 1994).
4 Results
1.7 Study characteristics
The main characteristics of each study are summarised in Table 1. The
SMD column represents the effect size estimate of the difference between
the patient and HC groups in theory of mind performance in each study.
Positive effect sizes indicate that the AN/ASD group performed better than
the  HC  group,  while  negative  effect  sizes  indicate  that  the  HC  group
outperformed the AN/ASD group. 
Table 1. Characteristics of studies investigating theory of mind in AN and ASD.
Study Group N;
N males
(BMI)
Age IQ Task SMD [95% CI]
Baron-Cohen  et
al. (1997a)
HFA/AS = 16 
males = 13
28.6 (9.7) WAIS-R = 105.31 (13.0) RMET  (old
version)
-1.47 [-2.08, -0.85]
HC = 50 
males = 25
30.0
(9.12)
Not measured
Baron-Cohen  et
al. (1997c)
HFA/AS = 16 
males = 13
28.6 (9.7) FSIQ = 105.31 (13.0) RMET -1.36 [-2.13, -0.59]
HC = 16 
males = 13
30.0
(9.12)
NART = 100.0 (10.0)
Baron-Cohen  et
al. (2001)
HFA/AS = 15 
males = 15
29.7
(14.5)
WAIS-R = 115.0 (16.1) RMET -1.69 [-2.53, -0.84]
HC = 14 
males = 14
28.0 (9.0) WAIS-R = 116.0 (6.4)
Baron-Cohen  et ASD (M) = 178 39.88 NR RMET -0.34 [-0.56, -0.13]
Study Group N;
N males
(BMI)
Age IQ Task SMD [95% CI]
al. (2015) males = 178 (11.56)
HC (M) = 152 
males = 152
37.70
(12.62)
NR
ASD (F) = 217 
males = 0
39.88
(11.80)
NR RMET -0.69 [-0.89, -0.48]
HC (F) = 168 
males = 0
39.15
(10.82)
NR
Beaumont  and
Newcombe (2006)
HFA/AS = 20
 males = 16
27.7
(12.9)
NART = 107.8 (8.1) TAT -0.42 [-0.72, -0.12]
HC = 20 
males = 16
27.7
(11.9)
NART = 106.1 (8.7) Commercials -0.85 [-1.50, -0.21]
Begeer  et  al.
(2010)
HFA = 34 
males = 26
16.0 (4.0) WISC-III
108.5 (21.1)
Reading task -0.77 [-1.27, -0.28]
Study Group N;
N males
(BMI)
Age IQ Task SMD [95% CI]
HC = 34 
males = 27
16.0 (3.0) WISC-III = 105.8 (18.3)
Beversdorf  et  al.
(1998)
ASD = 10 
males = 7
30.8 (9.3) WAIS-R = 109.7 (16.2) FBT -0.91 [-1.77, -0.04]
HC = 13 
males = 8
30.6
(12.8)
WAIS-R = 117.3 (11.2)
Blackshaw  et  al.
(2001)
AS = 25 
males = 20
22.7 (6.8) NART = 93.33 (11.5) PIT -0.75 [-1.38, -0.12]
HC = 18 
males = 7
31.39
(7.85)
NART = 109.5 (10.7)
Bowler (1992) AS = 15 
males = 13
26.7 (8.4) WAIS = 86.8 (11.4) FBT -0.46 [-1.19, 0.26]
HC = 15 
males = 7
NR Not measured
Study Group N;
N males
(BMI)
Age IQ Task SMD [95% CI]
Brewer  et  al.
(2017)
ASD = 163 
males = 113
27.0
(11.8)
WASI-II:  PRI  =  108.7
(13.5)
WASI-II:  VCI  =  103.0
(15.0)
FPT -0.60 [-0.88, -0.33]
SST -0.73 [-1.00, -0.45]
HC = 80 
males = 24
26.1
(10.2)
WASI-II:  PRI  =  106.4
(12.1)
WASI-II:  VCI  =  111.2
(13.9)
SHA -0.24 [-0.47, -0.01]
Brown  and  Klein
(2011) 
HFA/AS = 16 
male:female  =
3:1
25.8 (7.9) WAIS: vocabulary score =
12.56 (3.1)
SAT -1.28 [-1.91, -0.66]
HC = 16 
male:female  =
3:1
26.6 (7.0) WAIS: vocabulary score =
14.19 (2.7)
Study Group N;
N males
(BMI)
Age IQ Task SMD [95% CI]
Brunsdon  et  al.
(2015)
ASD = 181 
male:female  =
4.48:1
13.49
(0.69)
WASI = 90.0 (20.3) FBT -0.52 [-0.76, -0.29]
HC = 160 
male:female  =
2.20:1
12.79
(1.10)
WASI = 101.9 (15.1) SHA -0.24 [-0.92, 0.44]
Callenmark  et  al.
(2014)
ASD = 19 
males = 13
15.1 (1.6) WISC/WAIS: vocabulary =
8.8 (2.6)
DST -0.66  [-1.31,
-0.001]
HC = 19 
males = 13
15.3 (1.7) WISC/WAIS: vocabulary =
8.8 (2.6)
Craig et al. (2004) AS = 17 
males = 15
24.1 (6.7) NART = 104.8 (7.1) RMET -1.42, [-2.19, -0.66]
Study Group N;
N males
(BMI)
Age IQ Task SMD [95% CI]
HC = 16 
males = 11
19.4 (8.4) NART = 110.3 (9.9) Hint task -1.60 [-2.38, -0.81]
Crane  et  al.
(2013)
ASD = 28 
males = 14
41.6
(16.5)
WASI = 117.2 (13.5) SST -0.58 [-1.11, -0.04]
HC = 28 
males = 14
40.5
(17.2)
WASI = 115.1 (11.7)
Demurie  et  al.
(2011)
ASD = 13 
males = 12
14.4 (1.2) TIQ = 101.5 (11.6)
VIQ = 98.0 (11.9)
PIQ = 105.2 (14.3)
RMET -0.90 [-1.65, -0.15]
HC = 18 
males = 14
13.9 (1.7) Not measured
(Dziobek  et  al.,
2006a)
AS = 21 
males = 19
41.6
(10.4)
WAIS = 112.0 (6.1) RMET -1.50 [-2.19, -0.81]
Study Group N;
N males
(BMI)
Age IQ Task SMD [95% CI]
SST -0.77 [-1.42, -0.12]
HC = 20 
males = 18
39.9
(12.6)
WAIS = 124.0 (6.3)
MASC -2.24 [-3.04, -1.44]
Dziobek  et  al.
(2006b)
AS = 17 
males = 14
41.4 (9.9) WAIS-R = 113.0 (6.0) MASC  -
Emotions
-1.70 [-2.48, -0.91]
HC = 17 
males = 15
40.2
(13.0)
WAIS-R = 115.0 (5.0) MASC - Total -2.31 [-3.18, -1.45]
Flood et al. (2011) AS = 26 
males = 22
13.5 (1.4) NR SST -0.70 [-1.28, -0.13]
HC = 24 
males = 19
13.3 (1.1) NR
Golan  et  al.
(2006)
ASD = 22 
males = 17
29.0 (9.8) WASI = 114.2 (10.8) RMFT -1.30 [-1.95, -0.65]
Study Group N;
N males
(BMI)
Age IQ Task SMD [95% CI]
HC = 22 
males = 18
25.4 (9.5) WASI = 116.5 (11.0)
Golan  et  al.
(2007)
HFA/AS = 50 
males = 40
27.5 (8.5) WASI = 113.8 (11.5) RMET -1.16 [-1.69, -0.63]
HC = 22 
males = 17
24.3 (7.7) WASI = 114.5 (9.9) RMVT -1.34 [-1.88, -0.80]
Gonzalez-Gadea
et al. (2013)
AS = 23 
males = 15
33.0 (9.8) WAT = 37.4 RMET -0.13 [-0.72, 0.46]
HC= 21 
males = 11
38.2
(14.4)
WAT = 37.1 FPT -1.34 [-1.99, -0.69]
Grainger  et  al.
(2014)
ASD = 18 
males = 13
29.0
(10.3)
WASI = 112.3 (15.0) SHA -0.83 [-1.44, -0.23]
HC = 18 
males = 11
30.4
(14.6)
WASI = 114.9 (10.5)
Study Group N;
N males
(BMI)
Age IQ Task SMD [95% CI]
Heavey  et  al.
(2000)
ASD = 16 
males = 15
34.7 (9.5) WAIS-R = 89.6 (11.7) SST -1.55 [-2.36, -0.75]
HC = 15 
males = 15
30.7 (8.1) WAIS-R = 95.5 (14.7) AMT -1.72 [-2.55, -0.90]
Jolliffe and Baron-
Cohen (1999)
AS/ASD = 34 
males = 30
29.2 (7.8) WAIS-R = 106.1 (13.9) SST -1.53 [-2.18, -0.88]
HC = 17 
males = 15
30.0 (9.1) WAIS-R = 106.4 (12.7)
Kleinman  et  al.
(2000)
ASD = 24 
males = 21
31.4 (8.3) NR RMET -0.61 [-1.19, -0.03]
HC = 24 
males = 10
22.3 (5.8) NR RMVT -1.29 [-1.91, -0.66]
Klin (2000) HFA/AS = 40 
males = NR
19.7
(11.3)
WAIS = 96.8 (23.3) SAT -1.56 [-1.83, -1.30]
Study Group N;
N males
(BMI)
Age IQ Task SMD [95% CI]
HC = 20 
males = NR
20.2 (7.4) WAIS = 103.1 (18.0)
Kristen  et  al.
(2014)
ASD = 20
males = 15
28.3
(11.6)
Culture-Free  IQ  =  100.8
(22.1)
RMET -0.65 [-1.29, -0.02]
HC = 20 
males = 14
29.3
(11.1)
Culture-Free  IQ  =  103.9
(14.1)
SST -1.21 [-1.88, -0.53]
Lahera  et  al.
(2014)
AS = 22 
males = 18
21.9 (6.7) NR RMET -1.64 [-2.30, -0.99]
MASC -1.34 [-1.97, -0.72]
HC = 26 
males = 17
22.9 (4.8) NR
SST -1.63 [-2.28, -0.97]
Lai et al. (2012) ASD (M) = 32 
males = 32
27.0 (7.2) Full IQ = 113.7 (15.1) RMET -0.87 [-1.38, -0.36]
Study Group N;
N males
(BMI)
Age IQ Task SMD [95% CI]
HC (M) = 32 
males = 32
28.7 (5.9) Full IQ = 116.3 (11.8)
ASD (F) = 32 
males = 0
28.1 (8.2) Full IQ = 114.1 (15.5) RMET -1.13 [-1.65, -0.60]
HC (F) = 32 
males = 0
27.6 (6.3) Full IQ = 119.7 (8.4)
Lehnhardt  et  al.
(2011)
HFA = 39 
males = 25
31.1 (8.9) Full IQ = 127.9 (13.2) RMET -0.98 [-1.45, -0.51]
HC = 39 
males = 25
31.2 (8.1) Full IQ = 133.3 (11.6)
Lever  and  Geurts
(2015)
ASD = 118 
males = 83
47.6
(14.9)
WAIS: vocabulary = 114.8
(16.9)
FPT -0.41 [-0.67, -0.15]
HC = 118 
males = 83
47.7
(15.4)
WAIS: vocabulary = 114.3
(15.3)
(Lind et al., 2014) HFA = 27 35.5 WASI = 112.4 (16.4) SHA -0.62 [-1.26, 0.02]
Study Group N;
N males
(BMI)
Age IQ Task SMD [95% CI]
males = 21 (13.2)
HC = 29 
males = 22
33.3
(16.2)
WASI = 114.1 (11.0)
Lombardo  et  al.
(2007)
ASD = 30 
males = 23
29.1 (7.4) WASI = 117.2 (13.1) RMET -0.60 [-1.11, -0.08]
HC = 30 
males = 23
29.9 (78) WASI = 117.1 (8.7)
Lugnegard  et  al.
(2013)
AS = 53 
males = 26
27.3 (4.1) WAIS:  vocabulary = 10.4
(2.3)
RMET -0.28 [-0.67, 0.10]
HC = 50 
males = 19
28.8 (9.3) WAIS:  vocabulary  =  9.9
(2.1)
SHA -0.57 [-1.33, 0.19]
Marsh  and
Hamilton (2011)
HFA/AS = 18 
males = NR
33.0
(10.9)
WAIS:  Verbal  =  112.9
(16.6)
WAIS:  Performance  =
SHA -0.76 [-1.52, -0.01]
Study Group N;
N males
(BMI)
Age IQ Task SMD [95% CI]
104.4 (18.0)
HC = 19 
males = NR
32.2
(10.1)
WAIS:  Verbal  =  112.5
(13.8)
WAIS:  Performance  =
113.4 (13.9)
Martin  and
McDonald (2004)
AS = 14 
males = 13
19.6 (1.7) WAIS-III:  vocabulary  =
10.4 (3.3)
PIT -0.94 [-1.64, -0.25]
HC = 24 
males = 14
19.8 (3.4) WAIS-III:  vocabulary  =
12.8 (2.7)
Martinez  et  al.
(2017)
ASD = 19 
males = 15
22.7 (4.1) WAIS = 108.6 (16.9) MASC -1.73 [-2.12, -1.33]
HC = 20 
males = 17
23.4 (3.6) WAIS = 108.9 (11.0)
Study Group N;
N males
(BMI)
Age IQ Task SMD [95% CI]
Muller  et  al.
(2016)
ASD = 33 
males = 27
15.6 (1.9) WISC = 101.1 (14.4) RMET -0.37 [-0.91, 0.16]
HC = 23 
males = 14
16.3 (2.4) WISC = 109.8 (15.1)
MASC -0.87 [-1.43, -0.31]
Murray  et  al.
(2017)
ASD = 20 
males = 20
30.6 (6.5) WAIS:  verbal  =  105.1
(17.0)
RMET -0.53 [-1.26, 0.01]
SST -0.61 [-1.24, 0.03]
HC = 20 
males = 19
30.7 (6.3) WAIS:  verbal  =  112.3
(11.5) SHA -0.79 [-1.33, -0.25]
Oakley  et  al.
(2016)
ASD = 19
males = 14
30.9
(11.9)
WASI = 108.5 (11.7) MASC
Study Group N;
N males
(BMI)
Age IQ Task SMD [95% CI]
HC  (alexithymia-
matched) = 24
males = 15
30.1
(12.2)
WASI = 109.8 (15.7) RMET -0.10 [-0.70, 0.51]
Pedreno  et  al.
(2017)
HFA = 35 
males = 34
18.6 (6.4) WAIS-III/WISC  =  100.0
(15.6)
RMET -0.62 [-1.10, -0.14]
FPT -0.78 [-1.26, -0.29]
HC = 35 
males = 34
19.4 (6.2) WAIS-III/WISC  =  115.2
(10.7) SST -1.10[-1.61, -0.60]
Robinson  et  al.
(2017)
ASD = 24 
males = 20
14.0
(25.1)
WASI = 104.3 (11.8) RMET -0.64 [-1.22, -0.06]
HC = 24 
males = 20
14.0
(25.3)
WASI = 103.6 (9.9)
Rosenblau  et  al.
(2015)
ASD = 28 
males = 18
33.1 (8.5) MWT = 113.0 (16.4) AoE -0.88 [-1.46, -0.30]
Study Group N;
N males
(BMI)
Age IQ Task SMD [95% CI]
HC = 23 
males = 17
32.4 (8.9) MWT = 108.0 (12.9)
RMET -0.72 [-1.29, -0.16]
Rutherford  et  al.
(2002)
HFA/AS = 19 
males = 17
29.0
(14.5)
WAIS = 107.9 (12.7) RMVT -1.02 [-1.69, -0.36]
HC = 20 
males = 17
36.0
(10.7)
WAIS = 101.0 (7.3)
Samson  and
Hegenloh (2010)
AS = 19 
Males = 47.4%
27.8 (8.3) NR Cartoons -0.78 [-1.28, -0.29]
HC = 109
males = 38.5%
25.0 (5.7) NR
Sato et al. (2017) ASD = 19 
males = 14
28.1 (9.0) WAIS = 112.3 (13.7) RMET -0.89 [-1.55, -0.22]
HC = 19 
males = 14
23.3 (3.8) WAIS = 114.8 (7.0)
Study Group N;
N males
(BMI)
Age IQ Task SMD [95% CI]
Schaller and Rauh
(2017)
ASD = 23 
males = 23
15.7 (1.3) Full IQ = 105.7 (11.5) RMET -1.17 [-1.80, -0.53]
A-ToM
(recognition  of
emotions  being
conveyed)
-0.70 [-1.30, -0.10]
A-ToM
(recognition  of
false beliefs)
-0.87 [-1.48, -0.26]
HC = 22 
males = 22
15.9 (1.0) Full IQ = 103.8 (11.1) FBT -0.41 [-1.00, 0.18]
MASC -0.78 [-1.38, -0.17]
Study Group N;
N males
(BMI)
Age IQ Task SMD [95% CI]
Schneider  et  al.
(2013)
HFA = 18 
males = 15
27.8 WASI = 112.6 ToM Scale -0.66 [-1.35, 0.03]
HC = 16 
males = 13
31.2 WASI = 113.9 SST -0.61 [-1.30, 0.08]
Schuwerk  et  al.
(2015)
ASD = 18 
males = 12
24.1 (7.0) MWT = 104.3 (18.0)
Culture-Fair  IQ  =  91.4
(21.7)
RMET -1.18 [-1.88, -0.49]
HC = 19 
males = 13
25.3 (3.8) MWT = 102.5 (11.9)
Culture-Fair  IQ  =  98.3
(18.3)
SST -0.29 [-0.94, 0.36]
Segura  et  al.
(2015)
ASD = 21 
males = 20
19.7 (7.8) WAIS = 102.0 (11.0) RMET -0.53 [-1.30, 0.23]
Study Group N;
N males
(BMI)
Age IQ Task SMD [95% CI]
FPT -0.41 [-1.17, 0.35]
HC = 10 
males = 10
18.2 (1.4) WAIS = 110.0 (10.0)
SST -1.07 [-1.87, -0.27]
Senju  et  al.
(2009)
AS = 19 
males = NR
36.8
(14.3)
WAIS-III = 115.6 (14.9) FBT -0.52 [-1.18, 0.15]
HC = 17 
males = NR
39.6
(11.7)
WAIS-III = 115.3 (11.0)
SST -0.25 [-0.90, 0.41]
Shamay-Tsoory
(2008)
HFA/AS = 18 
males = 17
21.9 (6.3) NR C-ToM
(cognitive
theory of mind)
-0.77 [-1.42, -0.12]
Study Group N;
N males
(BMI)
Age IQ Task SMD [95% CI]
HC = 21 
males = 15
23.4 (6.3) NR C-ToM
(recognition  of
fortune  in
others,  e.g.
gloating)
-0.78 [-1.44, -0.13]
Spek et al. (2010) HFA/AS = 61 
males = 52
42.9
(10.7)
WAIS = 112.4 (15.4) FPT -0.76 [-1.20, -0.32]
HC = 32 
males = 24
38.7 (9.3) WAIS = 115.9 (10.0)
SST -0.26 [-0.69, 0.17]
Torralva  et  al.
(2013)
AS = 25 
males = 72%
33.9
(11.1)
NR RMET -0.37 [-0.89, 0.14]
HC = 36 36.4 (9.9) NR
FPT -1.44 [-2.01, -0.87]
Study Group N;
N males
(BMI)
Age IQ Task SMD [95% CI]
males = 60%
White  et  al.
(2011)
ASD = 16 
males = 12
33.0
(10.3)
WAIS:  Verbal  =  111.3
(12.7)
WAIS:  Performance  =
106.4 (12.8)
FBT -0.81 [-1.54, -0.08]
SST -1.16 [-1.92, -0.40]
HC = 15 
males = 11
36.5 (9.9) WAIS:  Verbal  =  114.1
(12.0)
WAIS:  Performance  =
110.5 (13.7)
SHA -1.06 [-1.45, -0.67]
White  et  al.
(2014)
ASD = 22 
males = 19
13.5 WISC: Verbal = 110.5
WISC:  Performance  =
99.0
FBT -0.83 [-1.58, -0.07]
HC = 11
males = 10
14.3 WISC: Verbal = 118.0
WISC:  Performance  =
Study Group N;
N males
(BMI)
Age IQ Task SMD [95% CI]
103.0
Wilson  et  al.
(2014)
ASD = 89 
males = 89
26.0 (7.0) Verbal IQ = 110.0 (14.0) RMET -0.98 [-1.29, -0.67]
FBT 0.09 [-0.21, 0.38]
HC = 89 
males = 89
28.0 (6.0) Verbal IQ = 109.0 (13.0)
SHA -0.72 [-1.39, -0.06]
Zalla et al. (2009) AS = 15 
males = NR
28.0 (7.0) WAIS-III = 114.8 (16.7) FPT -1.71 [-2.55, -0.88]
HC = 15 
males = NR
27.8 (4.5) WAIS-III = 115.3 (14.6)
Zalla and Leboyer
(2011)
HFA = 20 
males = 16
27.6 (6.7) WAIS = 93.5 (22.4) FPT -0.69 [-1.28, -0.10]
HC = 28 
males = 21
27.9 (7.6) WAIS = 97.7 (12.9)
Study Group N;
N males
(BMI)
Age IQ Task SMD [95% CI]
Zalla et al. (2015) HFA/AS = 19 
males = 16
28.8 (7.1) WAIS-III = 96.3 (19.8) FPT -1.36 [-2.07, -0.66]
HC = 19 
males = 15
26.4 (6.1) WAIS-III = 101.2 (7.5)
Zalla et al. (2016) ASD = 21 
males = NR
35.4
(14.5)
Full IQ = 101.7 (18.8) FPT -0.96 [-1.59, -0.32]
HC = 21 
males = NR
31.4
(13.6)
Full IQ = 102.8 (14.3)
Yeh et al. (2010) HFA/AS = 32 
males = 22
13.1 (2.4) WISC = 94.7 (11.8) FBT -0.75 [-1.24, -0.25]
FPT -0.96 [-1.46, -0.44]
HC = 34 
males = 23
12.8 (0.7) WISC = 93.4 (7.6)
SST -0.76 [-1.26, -0.26]
Adenzato  et  al. AN = 30 19.73 NR RMET -0.37 [-0.87, 0.13]
Study Group N;
N males
(BMI)
Age IQ Task SMD [95% CI]
(2012) males = 0
BMI = 15.1 (1.7)
(6.0)
HC = 32 
males = 0
BMI = 20.5 (2.7)
20.2 (1.5) NR
Bentz  et  al.
(2017a)
AN = 28 
males = 0
BMI = 16.6 (1.2)
16.1 (1.5) RIAS = 107.7 (10.5) RMET 0.42 [-0.06, 0.91]
SHA 0.10 [-0.38, 0.58]
HC = 41
males = 0
BMI = 22.0 (2.6)
17.7 (2.2) RIAS = 107.3 (9.5)
TASIT 0.14 [-0.29, 0.57]
AN-REC = 43 
males = 0
BMI = 21.3 (1.8)
18.4 (1.6) RIAS = 102.8 (11.5) RMET
Study Group N;
N males
(BMI)
Age IQ Task SMD [95% CI]
SHA -0.05 [-0.48, 0.38]
HC = 41
males = 0
BMI = 22.0 (2.6)
17.7 (2.2) RIAS = 107.3 (9.5)
TASIT -0.30 [-0.78, 0.18]
Brockmeyer et al.
(2016)
AN = 25 
males = 0
BMI = 15.3 (1.2)
23.7 (5.6) NR MASC  –
emotions
-0.63 [-1.19, -0.06]
HC = 25 
males = 0
BMI = 21.8 (1.8)
24.6 (2.3) NR MASC – total -0.40 [-0.96, 0.16]
Calvo Sagardoy et
al. (2014) 
AN (adolescent) =
21 
males = NR
BMI = 17.3 (11.2)
14 – 18 NR RMET -0.21 [-0.78, 0.36]
Study Group N;
N males
(BMI)
Age IQ Task SMD [95% CI]
HC (adolescent) =
28 
males = NR
BMI = 21.8 (17.9)
14 – 18 NR
AN (adult) = 27
 males = NR
BMI = 17.3 (11.2)
19 – 50 NR RMET -0.61 [-1.29, 0.06]
HC (adult) = 13 
males = NR
BMI = 21.8 (17.9)
19 – 50 NR
Gal et al. (2011) AN = 20 
males = NR
BMI = 16.5 (2.3)
15.5 (2.0) NR FPT -0.61 [-1.24, 0.03]
Study Group N;
N males
(BMI)
Age IQ Task SMD [95% CI]
HC = 20 
males = NR
BMI = 20.0 (2.9)
15.4 (2.0) NR FBT -0.52 [-1.15, 0.11]
Gillberg  et  al.
(2010)
AN-WR = 42 
males = NR
BMI = 22.4 (4.6)
32 WAIS-III = 99.4 (14.3) SHA -0.46 [-0.89, -0.04]
HC = 46 
males = 0
BMI = 23.4 (4.2)
32 WAIS-III = 104.1 (11.1)
Harrison  et  al.
(2009)
AN = 20 
males = 0
BMI = 15. 8 (1.2)
26.3 (5.7) NART = 114.5 (4.6) RMET -1.18 [-1.85, -0.51]
HC = 20 
males = 0
28.4 (8.5) NART = 114.9 (5.8)
Study Group N;
N males
(BMI)
Age IQ Task SMD [95% CI]
BMI = 21.8 (1.6)
Harrison  et  al.
(2010b)
AN = 48 
males = 0
BMI = 15.4 (1.8)
26.7 (9.8) NART = 11.4 (8.6) RMET -0.51 [-0.87, -0.15]
HC = 48 
males = 0
BMI = 21.6 (1.9)
28.5 (9.9) NART = 113.3 (7.4)
Jermakow  and
Brzezicka (2016)
AN = 10 
males = 0
BMI = 14 – 22
26.8 (4.3) NR RMET 0.49 [-0.20, 1.18]
HC = 33 
males = 0
BMI = NR
21.3 (1.4) NR
Kanakam  et  al.
(2013)
AN = 24 
males = 0
NR NR RMET -0.32 [-0.82, 0.19]
Study Group N;
N males
(BMI)
Age IQ Task SMD [95% CI]
BMI = NR
HC = 42 
males = 0
BMI = NR
NR NR
Kucharska  et  al.
(2016)
AN = 25 
males = 0
BMI = 17.6 (2.2)
27.1 (6.3) NR RMET -0.21 [-0.77, 0.34]
HC = 25 
males = 0
BMI = 23.4 (3.6)
24.5 (5.2) NR
Laghi et al. (2015) AN = 40 
males = 0
BMI = 15.8 (1.5)
14.9 (1.4) NR RMET 0.15 [-0.29, 0.59]
HC = 40 14.9 (0.6) NR
Study Group N;
N males
(BMI)
Age IQ Task SMD [95% CI]
males = 0
BMI = 21.9 (2.6)
Leppanen  et  al.
(2017a)
AN = 30 
males = 0
BMI = 16.3 (3.0)
26.2 (6.8) Not measured RMET 0.58 [0.06, 1.10]
HC = 29 
males = 0
BMI = 23.2 (3.7)
26.8 (8.5) Not measured
Medina-Pradas  et
al. (2012)
AN = 44 
males = 0
BMI = 15. 8 (1.7)
26.8 (9.9) NR RMET -0.75 [-1.20, -0.31]
HC = 39 
males = 0
BMI = 21.3 (2.1)
26.0
(14.7)
NR
Study Group N;
N males
(BMI)
Age IQ Task SMD [95% CI]
Oldershaw  et  al.
(2010)
AN = 40 
males = 3
BMI = 16.6 (1.3)
27.3
(10.0)
NART = 107.5 (11.2) RMET -0.53 [-1.00, -0.06]
RMVT -0.73 [-1.20, -0.25)
RMFT -0.74 [-1.22, -0.27]
HC = 47
males = 10
BMI = 23.0 (2.8)
29.8 (8.0) NART = 112.5 (7.9)
LEAS -0.36 [-0.82, 0.11]
Postorino  et  al.
(2017)
AN = 30 
males = 0
BMI = NR
14.2 (1.6) Full IQ = 105.0 (15.0) NEPSY-II -0.67 [-1.19, -0.15]
HC = 30 
males = 0
BMI = NR
13.6 (1.6) Full IQ = 106.0 (13.0)
Rommel  et  al. AN = 25 19.9 (3.1) NR LEAS -0.22 [-0.73, 0.29]
Study Group N;
N males
(BMI)
Age IQ Task SMD [95% CI]
(2013) males = 0
BMI = 14.8 (1.7)
HC = 37 
males = 0
BMI = 20.4 (2.5)
20.5 (3.0) NR
Rothschild-Yakar
et al. (2010)
AN = 34 
males = 0
BMI = 16.5 (2.4)
18.2 (2.7) NR SCORS -1.14 [-1.65, -0.63]
HC = 35 
males = 0
BMI = 20.1 (2.1)
17.8 (2.3) NR
Russell  et  al.
(2009)
AN = 22 
males = 0
BMI = 15.3 (1.2)
26.7 (4.8) NART = 118.3 (3.0) Cartoons -1.94 [-2.67, -1.21]
RMET -1.34 [-2.01, -0.67]
Study Group N;
N males
(BMI)
Age IQ Task SMD [95% CI]
HC = 20 
males = 0
BMI = 16.2 (2.0)
30.3 (6.5) NART = 119.2 (2.1)
Tapajoz Pereira De
Sampaio  et  al.
(2013b)
AN = 24 
males = 0
BMI = 18.1 (1.8)
24.5 (7.6) Full IQ = 102.5 (19.8) RMET -1.14 [-1.75, -0.53]
HC = 24 
males = 0
BMI = 21.5 (1.8)
25.2 (6.9) Full IQ = 100.2 (15.2) FPT -0.81 [-1.40, -0.22]
Tapajoz Pereira De
Sampaio  et  al.
(2013a)
AN = 22
males = 0
BMI = 18.1 (2.8)
24.3 (7.6) Word Accentuation Test =
101.4 (20.4)
RMET -1.21 [-1.83, -0.58]
Study Group N;
N males
(BMI)
Age IQ Task SMD [95% CI]
HC = 24
males = 0
BMI = 21.5 (1.8)
25.2 (6.9) Word Accentuation Test =
100.2 (15.2)
FPT -0.72 [-1.32, -0.13]
Tchanturia  et  al.
(2004)
AN = 20 
males = 0
BMI = 15.8 (2.2)
27.4 (7.9) NR Stories  (similar
to SST)
-0.68 [-1.32, -0.04]
HC = 20 
males = 0
BMI = 21.5 (1.5)
28.3 (7.4) NR Cartoons -0.58 [-1.22, 0.05]
ASD = autism spectrum disorder; AS = Asperger’s Disorder; HFA = high functioning autism; AN = anorexia 
nervosa; EDNOS = Eating Disorder Not Otherwise Specified; AN-REC = Recovered from anorexia nervosa; AN-WR =
Weight restored people with anorexia nervosa; F = female; M = male; AoE = Arena of Emotions; A-ToM = Animated 
Theory of Mind test; C-ToM = Computerised Theory of Mind test; MASC – Emotions = Emotions category of the 
Movie for the Assessment of Social Cognition; RMET = Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test; RMFT = Reading the Mind
in the Film Test; RMVT = Reading the Mind in the Voice Test; Levels of Emotional Awareness Scale; AMT = Awkward 
Moments Test; A-ToM = Animated Theory of Mind test; DST = Dewey Story Test; FBT = False Belief Test; FPT = Faux 
Pas Test; ToM Scale = Theory of Mind Scale; NEPSY-II = A Developmental NEuroPSYchological Assessment second 
edition; MASC = Movie for the Assessment of Social Cognition; PIS = Pragmatic Interpretation Stories; SST = 
Strange Stories Test; SCORS = Social Cognition and Object Relation; TASIT = The Awareness of Social Inference 
Test; PIT = Projective Imagination Test; SAT = Social attribution Test; SHA = Smith-Happé Animations; TAT = 
Thematic Apperception Test; IQ = intelligence quotient; WAIS(-R) = Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (revised); 
FSIQ = Full Scale Intelligence Quotient; NART = National Adult Reading Test; WISC  = Wechsler Intelligence Scale 
for Children; WASI = Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence; TIQ = Total Intelligence Quotient; VIQ = Verbal 
Intelligence Quotient; Performance Intelligence Quotient; MWIT = Mehrfachwahl-Wortschatz-Intelligenz test; WAT = 
Word accentuation test; RIAS = Reynolds Intellectual Assessment Scales; NR = not reported.
1.8 Study quality assessment
The study quality assessment results are shown in Supplementary Table 1.
Interrater reliability was acceptable (88.2 %) and no study met the criteria
for exclusion.  Only ten studies provided some sample size justification,
indicating  that  majority  of  the  studies  may  have  been  inadequately
powered. 
1.9 Emotional theory of mind
The standardised residuals and Cook’s distance of each study included in
the  meta-analysis  are  presented  in  Supplementary  Table  2  and
Supplementary  Figure  1  respectively.  The Z scores  of  the standardised
residuals of three studies  (Bentz et al., 2017a; Jermakow and Brzezicka,
2016;  Leppanen  et  al.,  2017a) exceeded  1.96,  but  the  corresponding
Cook’s distance values were less than 0.11 and did not exceed the cut off.
Therefore, the studies were not deemed to be influential outliers and were
included in the meta-analysis. 
The differences between healthy individuals and those with ASD and AN in
performance  on  the  emotional  theory  of  mind  tasks  are  presented  in
Figure  2  and  3,  respectively.  Due  to  the  large  number  of  studies,  the
results are presented in two figures to allow for better visualisation. The
meta-analysis  revealed  that  relative  to  the  HCs,  the  AN/ASD  groups
performed significantly worse with a medium effect size (g = -0.69, z =
-9.60, p < 0.0001, 95% CI [-0.83, -0.55]). When the two diagnostic groups
were  inspected  separately  there  was  a  significant  difference  between
people with ASD and the HCs with a large effect size (g = -0.84, z  =
-11.61,  p  <  0.0001,  95%  CI  [-0.98,  -0.69])  and  a  small,  significant
difference between people with AN and the HCs (g = -0.41, z = -3.09, p =
0.002, 95% CI [-0.67, -0.15]). 
There was also significant between-study heterogeneity (I2 = 76.23%, Q =
184.07, p < 0.0001), which was explored further with a meta-regression.
The  meta-regression  did  not  explain  a  significant  portion  of  the
heterogeneity  (Qmoderators =  16.58,  p  =  0.121),  leaving  significant,
unexplained residual heterogeneity (Qresidual = 52.41, p = 0.002). The final
model was formed of the following moderators: the diagnostic group (Z =
-0.33,  p = 0.739,  95% CI  [-0.86,0.61],  the percentage of  males  in  the
sample (Z = -0.01, p = 0.994, 95% CI [-0.83, 0.82]), age (Z = -0.98, p =
0.329, 95% CI [-0.05, 0.02]), the IQ of the patient group (Z = -0.48, p =
0.635, 95% CI [-0.05, 0.03]), the A-ToM task (Z = 1.33, p = 0.183, 95% CI
[-0.22, 1.18]), the LEAS  (Z = 0.97, p = 0.330, 95% CI [-0.30, 0.89]), the
emotions subscale of  the MASC (Z = -0.62, p = 0.535, 95% CI [-1.61,
0.89]), the RMET (Z = 0.44, p = 0.662, 95% CI [-0.37, 0.58]), the RMFT (Z
= -0.34, p = 0.736, 95% CI [-0.69, 0.49]), the RMVT (Z = -0.31, p = 0.754,
95% CI [-0.64, 0.46]), and the quality assessment score (Z = -0.67, p =
0.506, 95% CI [-3.52, 1.74]).  
Begg’s  rank correlation test  of  funnel  plot  asymmetry  suggested there
was  significant  publication  bias  present  (τ  =  -0.32,  p  =  0.0003;
Supplementary Figure 2). 
Figure 2. Emotional theory of mind in ASD.
ASD = autism spectrum disorder; AS = Asperger’s Disorder; HFA = high
functioning autism; F = female; M = male; AoE = Arena of Emotions; A-
ToM = Animated Theory of Mind test; C-ToM = Computerised Theory of
Mind test; MASC – Emotions = Emotions category of  the Movie for the
Assessment of  Social Cognition; RMET = Reading the Mind in the Eyes
Test; RMFT = Reading the Mind in the Film Test; RMVT = Reading the Mind
in the Voice Test; SMD = standardised mean difference; CI = Confidence
interval.
Figure 3. Emotional theory of mind in AN.

AN  =  anorexia  nervosa;  EDNOS  =  Eating  Disorder  Not  Otherwise
Specified;  Levels  of  Emotional  Awareness  Scale;  MASC  –  Emotions  =
Emotions category of the Movie for the Assessment of Social Cognition;
RMET = Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test; RMFT = Reading the Mind in
the  Film  Test;  RMVT  =  Reading  the  Mind  in  the  Voice  Test;  SMD  =
standardised mean difference; CI = Confidence interval. Calvo Sagardoy
et al. (2014) A = adolescent participants; Calvo Sagardoy et al. (2014) B =
adult participants.
1.10 Understanding of simple social interactions
The  standardised  residuals  and  Cook’s  distance  of  each  study  are
presented  in  Supplementary  Table  3  and  Supplementary  Figure  3
respectively. The Z score of a standardised residual of one study (Wilson et
al., 2014) exceeded 1.96, but the Cook’s distance of the study was 0.07
and did not  exceed 1.  Therefore,  the study was not  deemed to be an
influential outlier and was not removed from analysis. 
The differences between healthy individuals, autistic people and people
with AN in understanding of simple social interactions are presented in
Figure 4. The meta-analysis showed that the AN/ASD groups performed
significantly worse the HCs with a medium effect sizes (g = -0.76, z =
-9.63, p < 0.0001, 95% CI [-0.92, -0.61]).  Both the ASD and AN group
performed more poorly than the HCs with moderate effect sizes (ASD: g =
-0.79, z = -8.52, p < 0.0001, 95% CI [-0.97, -0.61]; AN: g = -0.69, z =
-4.75, p < 0.0001, 95% CI [-0.97, -0.40]).
The meta-analysis also revealed significant between-study heterogeneity
(I2 = 65.56%, Q = 70.51, p < 0.0001), which was explored further with a
meta-regression.  The meta-regression explained a significant  portion of
the between-study heterogeneity (Qmoderator = 44.92, p < 0.0001), leaving
no significant residual heterogeneity (Qresidual = 4.29, p = 0.933). The final
model was formed of the following moderators: the diagnostic group (Z =
-2.22, p = 0.027, 95% CI [-1.94, -0.12]), the percentage of males in the
sample (Z = 2.30, p = 0.022, 95% CI [0.17, 2.12], age (Z = 0.64, p =
0.524, 95% CI [-0.01, 0.01]), the IQ of the diagnostic group (Z = -0.64, p =
0.520, 95% CI [-0.04, 0.02]), the AMT (Z = -1.75, p = 0.080, 95% CI [-1.98,
0.11]),  the Hint task (Z = -1.02, p = 0.306, 95% CI [-1.43,  0.45]),  the
NEPSY-II (Z = 0.87, p = 0.383, 95% CI [-0.48, 1.25]), and the ToM Scale (Z
= 1.05, p = 0.293, 95% CI [-0.42, 1.38]), the FBT (Z = 1.74, p = 0.082,
95% CI [-0.05, 0.91]), the FPT (Z = 0.70, p = 0.486, 95% CI [-0.35, 0.74]),
and the quality assessment score (Z = 3.35, p = 0.001, 95% CI [1.44,
5.50]).  The  effect  appeared to  be  largely  driven  by  the  percentage of
males  in  the sample,  diagnostic  group,  and by the quality  assessment
scores. Studies with autistic participants, fewer males, and lower quality
assessment scores appeared to show the largest differences between the
diagnostic and control groups. However, since there were fewer studies
that included AN participants or primarily females, and the variance in the
quality  assessment  scores  was  very  small,  this  finding  should  be
interpreted with caution.   
Begg’s  rank  correlation  test  for  funnel  plot  asymmetry  indicated  that
significant  publication  bias  was  present  (τ  =  -0.26,  p  =  0.041;
Supplementary Figure 4). 
Figure 4. Understanding of simple social interactions in ASD and AN.
ASD = autism spectrum disorder; AS = Asperger’s Disorder; HFA = high
functioning autism;  AN = anorexia  nervosa;  AMT = Awkward Moments
Test; A-ToM = Animated Theory of Mind test; DST = Dewey Story Test; FBT
= False Belief Test; FPT = Faux Pas Test; ToM Scale = Theory of Mind Scale;
NEPSY-II  =  A  Developmental  NEuroPSYchological  Assessment  second
edition; SMD = standardised mean difference; CI = Confidence interval.
1.11 Understanding of complex social interactions
The  standardised  residuals  and  Cook’s  distance  of  each  study  are
presented  in  Supplementary  Table  4  and  Supplementary  Figure  5
respectively. The Z scores of standardised residuals of four studies (Bentz
et al., 2017a; Dziobek et al., 2006a; Dziobek et al., 2006b; Martinez et al.,
2017) exceeded 1.96, but the Cook’s distance values of the two studies
were less than 0.27 and did not exceed 1. Thus, these studies were not
deemed to be influential outliers and were not excluded from analysis. 
The  differences  between  healthy  individuals,  and  autistic  people  and
people  with  AN  in  understanding  of  complex  social  interactions  are
presented  in  Figure  5.  Overall,  the  AN/ASD  groups  were  significantly
poorer  in  comprehending  complex  social  interaction  than  the  healthy
individuals with a large effect size (g = -0.89, z = -10.12, p < 0.0001, 95%
CI  [-1.06,  -0.71]).  When inspected separately,  the  ASD and AN groups
performed poorer than healthy individuals with a large and medium effect
sizes, respectively (ASD: g = -0.94, z = -10.55, p < 0.0001, 95% CI [-1.12,
-0.77; AN: g = -0.54, z = -2.18, p = 0.029, 95% CI [-1.03, -0.06]). 
There  was  significant  between-study  heterogeneity  (I2 =  67.14%,  Q =
105.57,  p  < 0.0001),  which  was explored further.  The meta-regression
significantly explained a portion of the heterogeneity (Qmoderator = 19.13, p
= 0.004), but there was still significant residual heterogeneity (Qresidual  =
40.14, p = 0.0002). The final model consisted of the following moderators:
the percentage of males in the sample (Z = -0.79, p = 0.427, 95% CI [-
2.62, 1.11]), age (Z = -1.65, p = 0.099, 95% CI [-0.08, 0.01]), the IQ of the
patient  group  (Z  =  1.33,  p  =  0.184,  95%  CI  [-0.02,  0.09]),  the
Commercials task (Z = -0.33, p = 0.742, 95% CI [-1.27, 0.90]), the MASC
task  (Z  =  -4.15,  p  <  0.0001,  95%  CI  [-1.45,  -0.52]),  and  the  quality
assessment  score  (Z  =  0.21,  p  =  0.833,  95%  CI  [-4.39,  5.45]).  The
moderator affect  appeared to be largely  driven by the MASC task,  the
studies that used this task showed the largest differences between the
diagnostic and control groups. 
Begg’s rank correlation test of funnel plot asymmetry showed significant
evidence of publication bias (τ = -0.33, p = 0.006; Supplementary Figure
6). 
Figure 5. Understanding of complex social interactions in ASD and AN.
ASD = autism spectrum disorder; AS = Asperger’s Disorder; HFA = high
functioning autism; AN = anorexia  nervosa;  AN-REC = Recovered from
anorexia nervosa; C-ToM = Computerised Theory of Mind test; MASC =
Movie  for  the  Assessment  of  Social  Cognition;  PIS  =  Pragmatic
Interpretation  Stories;  SST  =  Strange  Stories  Test;  SCORS  =  Social
Cognition and Object Relation; TASIT = The Awareness of Social Inference
Test; SMD = standardised mean difference; CI = Confidence interval. 
1.12 Implicit social attribution
The standardised residuals and Cook’s distance of each study is presented
in Supplementary Table 5 and Supplementary Figure 7, respectively. The Z
score  of  the  standardised  residual  of  one  study  (Russell  et  al.,  2009)
exceeded 1.96, but the Cook’s distance was 0.23 and did not exceed 1.
Therefore, the study was not deemed an influential outlier and was not
removed from further analysis.
The  differences  between  healthy  individuals,  and  autistic  people  and
people  with  AN in  implicit  social  attribution  are presented in  Figure  6.
Overall, the AN/ASD groups performed more poorly on the tasks than the
healthy individuals with a medium effect size (g = -0.74, z = -6.33, p <
0.0001,  95%  CI  [-0.97,  -0.51]).  When  the  groups  were  inspected
separately,  both  performed  more  poorly  than  the  HCs  in  the  social
attribution tasks with large and medium effect sizes (ASD: g = -0.80, z =
-6.47, p < 0.0001, 95% CI [-1.00, -0.54]; AN: g = -0.70, z = -1.75, p =
0.080, 95% CI [-1.49, 0.08]). However, the difference between people with
AN and HCs did not reach significance. 
There was significant between-study heterogeneity (I2 = 79.28, Q = 92.81,
p  < 0.0001),  which  was  explored further.  The meta-regression did  not
explain a significant portion of the heterogeneity (Qmoderator = 14.99, p =
0.091), but left no significant residual heterogeneity (Qresiduals  = 3.96, p =
0.138).  The  final  model  consisted  of  the  following  moderators:  the
diagnostic  group  (Z  =  0.40,  p  =  0.690,  95%  CI  [-3.74,  5.64]),  the
percentage of males (Z = -0.83, p = 0.406, 95% CI [-3.12, 1.26]), age (Z =
-0.76, p = 0.449, 95% CI [-0.22, 0.10]), the IQ of the patient group (Z =
-0.16, p = 0.877, 95% CI [-0.08, 0.07]), the PIT (Z = 0.16, p = 0.870, 95%
CI [-4.77, 5.64]), the Reading task (Z = 0.08, p = 0.933, 95% CI [-5.32,
5.79]), the SHA  task (Z = 0.79, p = 0.431, 95% CI [-1.80, 4.22]), the TAT
(Z = 0.66, p = 0.509, 95% CI [-2.57, 5.19]), and the quality assessment
score (Z = -0.18, p = 0.859, 95% CI [-7.70, 6.42])..
Begg’s  rank  correlation  test  did  not  reveal  evidence  of  significant
publication bias (τ = -0.08, p = 0.679; Supplementary Figure 8). 
Figure 6. Implicit social attribution in ASD and AN.
ASD = autism spectrum disorder; AS = Asperger’s Disorder; HFA = high
functioning autism; AN = anorexia  nervosa;  AN-REC = Recovered from
anorexia  nervosa;  AN-WR  =  Weight  restored  people  with  anorexia
nervosa; PIT = Projective Imagination Test; SAT = Social attribution Test;
SHA = Smith-Happé Animations; TAT = Thematic Apperception Test; SMD
= standardised mean difference; CI = Confidence interval. 

5 Discussion
The aim of the present review was to examine the theory of mind profile in
autistic people as well as in people with AN. The majority of the available
studies included autistic individuals, and it became clear that areas other
than emotional theory of mind have been relatively under-researched in
AN. The meta-analyses showed that autistic people and people with AN
have  similar  theory  of  mind  profiles.  Although  both  diagnostic  groups
performed more poorly in the theory of mind tasks than HC individuals,
autistic people appeared to have more difficulties than those with AN. This
finding suggests that there are a number of similarities between autistic
people and people with AN in social cognition, but there may also be some
differences that warrant further investigation.
The effect size estimates suggested that there may be some differences
between people with AN and autistic people in emotional theory of mind
even  though  the  diagnostic  group  did  not  emerge  as  a  significant
moderator  of  between-study  heterogeneity.   People  with  AN  showed
significant  difficulties  in  emotional  theory  of  mind  relative  to  healthy
individuals, but these difficulties appeared to be less severe compared to
autistic people. This finding is in line with a recent suggestion that people
with AN may have greater difficulties with implicit responses to emotional
cues, including response and interpretation biases, rather than in explicit
labelling  (Adenzato et al.,  2012;  Cardi  et  al.,  2013;  Cardi  et  al.,  2017;
Davies et al., 2016; Harrison et al., 2011; Harrison et al., 2010a; Leppanen
et  al.,  2017b;  Mendlewicz  et  al.,  2005).  Indeed,  a  recent  experimental
study  reported  that  although  people  with  AN  had  some  difficulties  in
recognising  disgust,  this  may  have  been  driven  by  a  bias  towards
interpreting this facial affect as anger (Dapelo et al., 2016). Conversely, a
recent  meta-analytic  review  documented  that  autistic  people  display
difficulties in recognition of basic emotions with small to large effect sizes
(Uljarevic  and  Hamilton,  2013).  Moreover,  experimental  work  has
demonstrated  that  even  after  correcting  for  response  biases,  autistic
people  show  general  difficulties  in  the  explicit  detection  of  emotions
(Evers et al., 2015). Taken together, these findings suggest that people
with AN and autistic people may have different difficulties in processing
and responding to emotional cues. 
findings that people with AN do not show difficulties in understanding or
explaining  the  meaning  of  non-literal  abstract  concepts  and  proverbs
(Bentz et al., 2017b). Still, it seems that people with AN have difficulties
understanding  non-literal  communication  when  it  appears  in  a  social
context  (Rothschild-Yakar  et  al.,  2010;  Tchanturia  et  al.,  2004a).
Conversely, difficulties with understanding abstract, non-literal concepts,
such as metaphors and proverbs, is a recognised feature of ASD and is
likely related to more general difficulties in language processing (Boucher,
2012;  Ganz and Flores,  2009;  Olofson et  al.,  2014;  Tager-Flusberg and
Caronna,  2007).  Taken  together,  it  may  be  that  people  with  AN  and
autistic  people have differential  difficulties in  understanding non-literal,
complex social interactions. 
People with AN and autistic  individuals  showed similar performance on
measures of understanding simple and complex social interactions as well
as  in  implicit  social  attribution,  even  though the  AN group did  not  do
significantly worse on social attribution than the HCs. The present findings
are supported by previous work showing that both people with AN and
autistic  people  report  elevated  social  anhedonia  and  have  similar
neuropsychological processing profiles (Chevallier et al., 2012a; Chevallier
et al., 2012b; Harrison et al., 2014; Tchanturia et al., 2012; Westwood et
al., 2017b). Further support comes from the notion that these processes
could be influenced by participants’ understanding of the implicit social
rules that guide behaviour in social situations (Baez et al., 2012; Jameel et
al.,  2015;  Kipps  and  Hodges,  2006;  Zalla  et  al.,  2009).  Interestingly,
previous  work  has  documented  that  autistic  people  have  a  good
understanding of explicit social rules, but struggle when rules are abstract
or  implicit,  or  when  the  spontaneous  application  of  existing  rules  is
needed (Baez et al., 2012; Myles et al., 2001). Similarly, there has been
some suggestion  that  although semantic  understanding  of  social  rules
may be intact in AN, when these rules are embedded into social scenarios
the  picture  becomes  complex  and  people  with  AN  have  difficulties
detecting when rules are broken  (Bentz et al.,  2017b).  Taken together,
these  findings  suggest  that  spontaneous  application  of  social  rules  to
abstract stimuli may be similarly affected in AN and ASD. 
It  is  of  interest  that  people  with  AN appeared  to  have somewhat  less
severe difficulties in both understanding of social interactions, relative to
autistic  people.  Although  this  finding  could  be  driven  by  the  relative
paucity of research examining these processes in people with AN, it could
also indicate that there may be differences in the underlying processes
between these two groups and further research is needed. Indeed, recent
behavioural findings suggest that people with AN do not show difficulties
in abstract thinking in general, including understanding or explaining the
meaning  of  non-literal  abstract  concepts  and  proverbs  (Bentz  et  al.,
2017b). It seems that people with AN have difficulties understanding non-
literal  communication  specifically  when  it  appears  in  a  social  context
(Rothschild-Yakar  et  al.,  2010;  Tchanturia  et  al.,  2004).  Conversely,
difficulties  with  understanding  abstract,  non-literal  concepts,  such  as
metaphors  and proverbs,  is  a  recognised feature  of  ASD regardless  of
context  and  is  likely  related  to  more  general  difficulties  in  language
processing  (Boucher, 2012; Ganz and Flores, 2009; Olofson et al., 2014;
Tager-Flusberg and Caronna, 2007). Taken together, it may be that people
with AN and autistic people have differential difficulties in understanding
non-literal  social  interactions  and  implicit  attribution  of  social
understanding. However, further research, particularly studies examining
these  processes  in  AN,  is  still  needed  before  firm  conclusions  can  be
drawn.
6 Limitations and future directions
The main limitation of  the present  review is  that  we were not  able to
directly compare performance on theory of mind tasks between autistic
individuals and people with AN due to a lack of studies. Instead, the two
groups were compared by first  calculating SMD comparing the AN/ASD
group against a HC group, and then conducting a meta-regression. This
sets some limits on the conclusions that can be drawn from this review as
it  is  difficult  to  detect  any  subtle  differences  in  theory  of  mind
performance  between  the  two  diagnostic  group  through  this  method.
Thus,  the  present  findings  highlights  the  need  for  further  research  to
examine the theory of mind profiles in these related disorders, particularly
in the light of the subtle differences observed in the effect size estimated
between the two group in emotional theory of mind and understanding of
simple social interactions. Further research into similarities and potential
differences in the theory of  mind profiles between people with AN and
autistic  individuals  could  help  to  further  the  understanding  of  the
underlying aetiology in both disorders. 
Another  limitation  is  that  there  were  substantially  fewer  studies
investigating  theory  of  mind,  especially  understanding  of  social
interactions  and  social  attribution,  in  people  with  AN.  This  shows  that
theory of mind is a relatively under-researched area compared to work
focusing  on  eating  related  behaviours,  which  has  been  the  traditional
focus in the eating disorder literature.   The present review shows that
further research into theory of mind in AN is warranted, especially in the
light of theoretical models that highlight the role of social cognition in the
development  and  maintenance  of  disordered  eating  (Treasure  and
Schmidt, 2013). This means that when diagnostic group was entered as a
moderator in the meta-regressions the number of studies that included
autistic people and those that included people with AN were not balanced.
Such unbalances could have influenced the results of the present meta-
regressions could have impacted the results. Therefore, further research
with more complex tasks is still needed to provide a clear picture of the
theory of mind profile in AN.
The meta-analyses also revealed significant between-study heterogeneity,
which could be partly  explained by differences between the diagnostic
groups,  in  the  tasks  used,  in  the  average  age  of  the  sample,  in  the
proportion of  males in the sample, and in the IQ of the patient group.
Some  studies  using  specific  tasks,  such  as  the  MASC,  reported
significantly  greater  differences  between  the  diagnostic  and  control
groups than other studies. Further examination of the subtle differences
between  the  tasks  may  be  of  interest  for  future  studies  to  establish
whether there may be more fine grained differences in  the aspects of
theory of mind measured in these tasks. This also suggests that future
studies may benefit  from greater  consistency in  the tasks  used,  which
would provide a clearer picture of the theory of mind profile in both ASD
and AN. 
Disentangling the impact of gender, age, and IQ on the between-study
heterogeneity is more difficult. Although they contributed to a significant
model,  they did not  individually  significantly  explain the heterogeneity.
However,  the  present  review  does  show  that  majority  of  the  studies
investigating theory of mind in autistic adolescents and adults included a
large number of male participants with only few females. The studies that
investigated  theory  of  mind  in  people  with  AN,  on  the  other  hand,
primarily included only female participants. Additionally, majority of the
studies included in the present review recruited adults between the ages
of 18 and 35. A few studies included adolescents under the age of 18 and
no studies included older adults. Similarly, majority of the studies included
participants with average or above average IQ. This gender, age, and IQ
imbalance could be a potential source of between-study heterogeneity. 
Interestingly, in three of the meta-analyses a combination of these factors
at least partially explained the between-study heterogeneity, while in one
of  the  meta-analyses  we  were  unable  to  identify  the  source  of  the
heterogeneity.  Although  we  were  unable  to  identify  the  source  of  the
unexplained  heterogeneity,  it  is  possible  that  variability  in  the  patient
groups  could  have  had  an  impact.  Twelve  studies  reported  that  they
included  mixed  groups  of  people  with  Asperger’s  syndrome,  high-
functioning ASD, and low-functioning ASD. Additionally,  as starvation is
believed to have substantial impact on social and cognitive functioning in
AN (Keys et al., 1950), it is of importance to note that the majority of the
studies in the present review included only underweight AN participants.
Although two studies included AN participants who were weight restored
or recovered, it is not possible to ascertain that theory of mind difficulties
in AN are not at least partly due to the impact of malnutrition on the brain.
Indeed, a systematic review of social-emotional processing in AN across
illness stage reported that those recovered from AN had fewer difficulties
in  emotional  awareness  in  self  and  others  (Oldershaw  et  al.,  2011).
However,  some  difficulties,  such  as  implicit  attentional  bias  towards
negative  social  cues,  appeared  to  persist  after  recovery  from  AN
(Oldershaw et  al.,  2011).  Moreover,  we were  not  able  to  examine the
potential confounding impact of mood and anxiety on performance on the
theory  of  mind  tasks.  This  would  be  an  important  factor  to  examine
further,  particularly  as  people  with  AN  and  autistic  individuals  report
significantly higher levels of depression and anxiety relative to the general
population  (Oldershaw et al., 2011). Additionally, people with mood and
anxiety  disorders  show  altered  performance  on  a  number  of  tasks
assessing  social-cognition,  including  theory  of  mind  (Oldershaw  et  al.,
2011). Future studies may benefit from further exploring the impact of
these variables on theory of mind in ASD and AN.
In the meta-analysis that examined emotional theory of mind, majority of
the studies used the RMET or a variation of the task. This task has recently
been criticised for being an emotion recognition task rather than a theory
of mind task  (Oakley et al., 2016). This makes it difficult to determine if
poorer performance in this task is due to difficulties in theory of mind or
due difficulties such as alexithymia  (Oakley et al., 2016). The RMET has
also been criticised for using non-naturalistic, static images restricted to
the  eye  region  and  for  using  multiple-choice  format,  which  has  been
suggested to increase bias in the accuracy scores (Johnston et al., 2008).
However,  these criticisms are true of  a number of  other paradigms as
well,  such as the C-ToM. Therefore,  although the studies that used the
RMET  did  not  emerge  as  significant  moderators  of  between-study
heterogeneity,  future  studies  may benefit  from using alternative,  more
ecologically valid tasks to assess emotional theory of mind.
Finally, all meta-analyses revealed significant publication bias according to
Begg’s test of funnel plot asymmetry. This is an important limitation of the
present  review as  it  suggests  that  many small  studies  reported  larger
effect sizes than larger studies. This can be an indication of inflated effect
sizes in small studies, which would lead to bias in the pooled effect size
estimates (Zhang et al., 2013). Therefore, more larger studies are needed
to gain a clear picture of theory of mind profiles in both ASD and AN.
7 Conclusions
The present review examined the theory of mind profile in ASD and AN.
The majority of the studies included autistic individuals indicating relative
paucity  of  research  in  AN.  Overall,  autistic  people  and  those  with  AN
appeared  to  have  similar  difficulties  in  all  aspects  of  theory  of  mind.
However,  there  was  some  indication  of  potential  group  differences  in
emotional theory of  mind. Autistic people showed greater difficulties in
task  performance  and  further  investigation  of  potential  differences
between autistic  people  and  individuals  with  AN would  be  of  interest.
These findings are supported by previous work demonstrating that there
are similarities in certain aspects of social emotional and neurocognitive
processing  between  individuals  with  AN  and  autistic  people.  Further
research  investigating  the  processes  that  underlie  theory  of  mind
difficulties in both AN and ASD would be of interest. 
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10 Figure legends
Figure 1. Study selection flow charts. A. The study selection flow chart of
studies investigating theory of mind in autism spectrum disorders. B. The
study  selection  flow  chart  of  studies  investigating  theory  of  mind  in
anorexia nervosa.
Figure 2. Emotional theory of mind in ASD.
ASD = autism spectrum disorder; AS = Asperger’s Disorder; HFA = high
functioning autism; F = female; M = male; AoE = Arena of Emotions; A-
ToM = Animated Theory of Mind test; C-ToM = Computerised Theory of
Mind test; MASC – Emotions = Emotions category of  the Movie for the
Assessment of  Social Cognition; RMET = Reading the Mind in the Eyes
Test; RMFT = Reading the Mind in the Film Test; RMVT = Reading the Mind
in the Voice Test; SMD = standardised mean difference; CI = Confidence
interval.
Figure 3. Emotional theory of mind in AN.
AN  =  anorexia  nervosa;  EDNOS  =  Eating  Disorder  Not  Otherwise
Specified;  Levels  of  Emotional  Awareness  Scale;  MASC  –  Emotions  =
Emotions category of the Movie for the Assessment of Social Cognition;
RMET = Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test; RMFT = Reading the Mind in
the  Film  Test;  RMVT  =  Reading  the  Mind  in  the  Voice  Test;  SMD  =
standardised mean difference; CI = Confidence interval. Calvo Sagardoy
et al. (2014) A = adolescent participants; Calvo Sagardoy et al. (2014) B =
adult participants.
Figure 4. Understanding of simple social interactions in ASD and AN.
ASD = autism spectrum disorder; AS = Asperger’s Disorder; HFA = high
functioning autism;  AN = anorexia  nervosa;  AMT = Awkward Moments
Test; A-ToM = Animated Theory of Mind test; DST = Dewey Story Test; FBT
= False Belief Test; FPT = Faux Pas Test; ToM Scale = Theory of Mind Scale;
NEPSY-II  =  A  Developmental  NEuroPSYchological  Assessment  second
edition; SMD = standardised mean difference; CI = Confidence interval.
Figure 5. Understanding of complex social interactions in ASD and AN.
ASD = autism spectrum disorder; AS = Asperger’s Disorder; HFA = high
functioning autism; AN = anorexia  nervosa;  AN-REC = Recovered from
anorexia nervosa; C-ToM = Computerised Theory of Mind test; MASC =
Movie  for  the  Assessment  of  Social  Cognition;  PIS  =  Pragmatic
Interpretation  Stories;  SST  =  Strange  Stories  Test;  SCORS  =  Social
Cognition and Object Relation; TASIT = The Awareness of Social Inference
Test; SMD = standardised mean difference; CI = Confidence interval. 
Figure 6. Implicit social attribution in ASD and AN.
ASD = autism spectrum disorder; AS = Asperger’s Disorder; HFA = high
functioning autism; AN = anorexia  nervosa;  AN-REC = Recovered from
anorexia  nervosa;  AN-WR  =  Weight  restored  people  with  anorexia
nervosa; PIT = Projective Imagination Test; SAT = Social attribution Test;
SHA = Smith-Happé Animations; TAT = Thematic Apperception Test; SMD
= standardised mean difference; CI = Confidence interval. 
Supplementary Figure 1. Cook’s distance plot of studies investigating 
emotional theory of mind.
Supplementary Figure 2. Funnel plot of emotional theory of mind in ASD 
and AN.
Supplementary Figure 3. Cook’s distance plot of studies investigating 
understanding of simple social interactions.
Supplementary Figure 4. Funnel plot of understanding of simple social 
interactions in ASD and AN.
Supplementary Figure 5. Cook’s distance plot of studies investigating 
understanding of complex social interactions.
Supplementary Figure 6. Funnel plot of understanding of complex social 
interactions in ASD and AN.
Supplementary Figure 7. Cook’s distance plot of studies investigating 
implicit social attribution.
Supplementary Figure 8. Funnel plot of implicit social attribution in ASD 
and AN
Supplementary Table 1. Study quality assessment.
N/A = not applicable. 
